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Introduction: an expanding community of values? 
 
When launching the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Union 
(EU) expected that through a steady process of rapprochement, the neighbouring 
countries would progressively become part of the EU’s community of values. The 
European Commission (2004: 5) declared that “[t]he European Neighbourhood 
Policy’s vision involves a ring of countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values and 
objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation 
to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration”. This promise 
raised high expectations for a comprehensive regulatory and legislative alignment of 
the neighbours with significant socio-economic and political reforms according to the 
priorities set out in jointly agreed Action Plans and with benchmarks that can be 
monitored and assessed. The Action Plans would cover “first, commitments to 
specific actions which confirm or reinforce adherence to shared values and […] 
secondly, commitments to actions which will bring partner countries closer to the EU 
in a number of priority fields” (ibid.: 9).  
 
Ten years later, it has become clear that the ambitious goal of expanding the ‘zone 
of prosperity, stability and security’ beyond the EU’s borders is far – perhaps even 
further away – from being achieved. The EU’s neighbourhood has become politically 
more fragmented and unstable, the pace of economic and democratic transitions has 
slowed down, and the EU reluctantly finds itself in competition with Russia over the 
common eastern neighbourhood while its engagement in the south has been 
questioned by the Arab uprisings and their unintended consequences. In other 
words, “there is hardly any other external policy of the EU with a larger gap between 
its stated objectives and the actual outcome” (Lehne 2014: 4). This paper addresses 
this puzzle by looking into the promotion of values since values were attributed a 
prominent role in the ENP. 
 
The EU has since the early 1990s – since the end of the Cold War and since the 
completion of its internal market – increasingly pursued normative foreign policy 
objectives and explicitly committed itself to the externalization of both political and 
economic norms. The political momentum after the fall of Communism had brought 
about the perspective of democratization and market liberalization worldwide. The 
EU’s aspiration to project these values beyond its borders has further been 
reinforced by the Treaty of Lisbon. According to Art. 2 TEU, “[t]he Union is founded 
on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
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minorities”. Any European state which respects these values and is committed to 
promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union (Art. 49 TEU); and the 
EU shall uphold and promote these values in its relations with the wider world (Art. 
3(5) TEU). In addition to human rights and democratic standards, the European 
Union frequently cites the principles of market economy and sustainable 
development among the values that it intends to share with its neighbours. These 
political and economic values are thus constitutive of the EU’s self-perception and 
self-projection abroad.  
 
Manners’ (2002: 242) seminal concept of ‘normative power Europe’ conceives of the 
EU as a value-driven foreign policy actor based on the core norms that form its own 
identity (peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms). Among the ‘minor’ norms are social solidarity, anti-
discrimination, sustainable development and good governance. Manners (2002: 236, 
253) defines ‘normative power’ as “the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in 
world politics”, and the most important factor shaping the EU’s international role “is 
not what it does or what it says, but what it is” (ibid.: 252). 
 
In response to the ‘normative power Europe’ debate, which has mostly focused on 
political values, Damro (2012: 682) argues that because the European Union is, at 
its core, a market, it may also be conceptualized as a ‘market power Europe’ which 
“exercises its power through the externalization of economic and social market-
related policies and regulatory measures”. He sees the internal market as an 
alternative basis of the EU’s identity, and thus its power, with three interrelated 
characteristics predisposing the Union to act as a market power: the large size of its 
market, its institutional features as a regulatory entity and the interest group 
contestation that this generates (ibid.: 686). Indeed, also the European Commission 
(2007: 5) perceives the internal market as “a powerful engine to promote EU high 
quality rules and values around the world” because “[t]hrough the enlargement 
process and the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Community rulebook is 
gradually being adopted across large parts of the European continent”, and the 
internal market is “increasingly serving as a reference point in third countries as well 
as in global and regional fora”. 
 
Values underpin more concrete norms and guide action in a given situation. 
Cremona (2011: 275) argues that “in order to lead to concrete outcomes, the ‘values’ 
which have a symbolic significance for the EU must find practical expression in legal 
norms”, whether these norms are derived from the Treaties or imported into the EU’s 
legal order. However, norms may not only be of a legal nature but also comprise 
social norms about appropriate behaviour and they may have both regulative and 
constitutive functions. With Björkdahl (2002: 21), norms can be more broadly defined 
as “intersubjective understandings that constitute actors’ interests and identities, and 
create expectations as well as prescribe what appropriate behaviour ought to be”.  
 
In the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the common values are 
located “principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect 
for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly 
relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development” 
(European Commission 2004: 3). The Lisbon Treaty took this policy up and asked 
the EU to “develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to 
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establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of 
the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation” 
(Art. 8(1) TEU). 
 
At the outset of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU has to a large extent 
taken these values and their export for granted. This paper asks why the promotion 
of values in the ENP has become a matter of contestation. It argues that, first, the 
values themselves have been challenged because of (1) their ambiguous nature, (2) 
the potential conflicts between them (in particular between political and economic 
values) resulting in policy incoherence, and (3) the (re-)emergence of competing 
values in the Arab world and in the post-Soviet space. Second, the mechanisms of 
value export have been challenged because (1) some neighbours have been 
incapable and/or unwilling to absorb the values, (2) the EU and its member states 
have failed to conduct a consistent, credible policy, and (3) the EU is facing 
normative rivalry from other actors such as Russia in the east. In other words, the 
European Neighbourhood Policy faces challenges of capacity, consistency and 
competition.  
 
Following this line of reasoning, the paper is structured in two main parts, the first 
focusing on issues linked to the values themselves and the second part dealing with 
the mechanisms of exporting the values, followed by the conclusions.  
 
Contestation of values  
 
The values in the ENP have been queried for three main reasons: the manifold 
ambiguities of the nature and substance of values, the shift of focus from political to 
economic values in the ENP, especially with the advent of Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), and the (re-)emergence of competing values in the 
neighbourhood.  
 
The ambiguity of values  
 
At least three ambiguities can be discerned besides the fact that the Treaties tend to 
conflate different concepts into an overlapping terminology of values, principles and 
objectives (Cremona 2011: 278).  
 
First, the EU on the one hand actively promotes its values in the neighbourhood 
through various instruments, including conditionality, while on the other hand it 
appears to assume that these values are already shared and form the basis for 
developing relations. Art. 21(1) TEU requires the Union to seek to build partnerships 
with third countries “which share the principles on which it is founded”. In particular 
the neighbouring countries are thereby associated with shared values, as many EU 
statements on the Stabilization and Association Process with the Western Balkans 
and on the ENP show (Cremona 2011: 301-303).  
 
A second ambiguity is pointed out by Leino and Petrov (2009) who argue that the EU 
institutions use the notion of ‘common values’ as both a universal concept and as an 
EU concept: on the one hand, the values constitute the EU’s foundation, while on the 
other hand, they are universal. When promoting the values abroad, the Union can 
thus claim not to be imposing its own values on others but rather using its influence 
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to bring the practice of foreign governments in line with their own professed values. 
The EU also explicitly encourages ENP countries to embrace international norms, for 
instance by signing up to international agreements. The abstraction of values results 
in a European Neighbourhood Policy which “formally promotes jointly shared values 
but which, in practice, amounts to the EU’s own reading of them” (ibid.: 656). Hence, 
views may differ not only with regard to the identification of the relevant values as 
such but also about their definition, for instance what kind of democracy, market 
economy or conception of human rights should be promoted. Even within the 
European Union the member states interpret the ‘shared values’ not always in the 
same way. Interestingly, the very first ‘Wider Europe’ Communication of the 
European Commission (2003: 3-4) referred to shared values with a footnote to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, whereas the ENP Strategy Paper one year 
later focused on international standards, including human rights conventions of the 
United Nations, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Cooperation and 
Security in Europe (European Commission 2004: 12-13). 
 
Third, the question arises how the rather abstract values should be implemented. 
They need to be transposed into concrete reform steps in the Action Plans that can 
be monitored and, if necessary, enforced. Ghazaryan (2014: 136, 148), for example, 
finds with regard to democracy promotion in the Southern Caucasus that the ENP 
Action Plans fall short of translating the political rhetoric on democratic reforms into 
operational and measureable plans of action and that democratic values are in fact 
only partially and to varying degrees included. Moreover, the monitoring process and 
the assistance provided for the implementation of the Action Plans “renders the 
democratic reform subsidiary, or in some cases irrelevant, within the ENP” (ibid.: 
175). More generally, Bosse (2007) argues that there is no coherent discourse on 
values nor an agreement among EU actors or among and within ENP partners on 
the contents and significance of these values. Furthermore, there is a gap between 
the political rhetoric on shared values and the capability to enforce these values. In a 
similar vein, Kochenov (2014: 53) contends that more attention needs to be paid to 
the export of values because “the acquis is not necessarily about the values on 
which the Union is founded”, nor can the acquis “be taken as guarantor of such 
values’ enforcement and promotion”. In the EU’s perspective, the acceptance of 
values includes the legislative approximation to the often technical, legal acquis. 
While conditionality may promote the export of acquis, it may be less suitable for the 
export of values which actors need to internalize.  
 
In addition to the ambiguous nature of values, their substance and coherence has 
also been questioned.  
 
Conflict potential of values  
 
In the literature and policy debate the focus has largely been on political values 
rather than on economic values. Yet, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights covers 
both civil and political rights as well as social and economic rights, and the Union’s 
aim to promote “the well-being of its peoples” (Art. 3(1) TEU) includes the 
establishment of an internal market, sustainable development and “a highly 
competitive social market economy” (Art. 3(3) TEU). Moreover, solidarity is an 
express goal of EU external action (Art. 21(1) TEU).  
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On the eve of Eastern enlargement, the European Council (2002: para 22) had 
stated that the dynamics of the accession process presented “an important 
opportunity to take forward relations with neighbouring countries based on shared 
political and economic values”. The economic reform agenda normally includes 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a prerequisite for concluding a 
free trade agreement with the EU. The development of the ENP soon embraced 
‘deep integration’ as well as ‘deep democracy’. Deep economic integration – as 
exemplified by the DCFTAs – refers to ‘behind-the-border integration’ such as 
common standards or competition rules, in contrast to ‘shallow integration’ which 
focuses on the removal of barriers at the border like tariffs and quotas (Lawrence 
1996: xviii, 17). In the context of EU external relations, deep economic integration 
implies legal approximation to or adoption of parts of the EU’s acquis. The 2011 
review of the ENP introduced the notion of ‘deep democracy’ which inter alia 
includes free and fair elections, freedom of association and expression, the rule of 
law, the fight against corruption, security and law enforcement sector reform and the 
establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces (European 
Commission and High Representative 2011: 3). The new Association Agreements 
with DCFTAs contain a ‘common values conditionality’ that goes beyond human 
rights and democratic principles and embraces, for instance, the respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity or the fight against corruption, organized crime, 
terrorism and proliferation of weapons as well as the principles of free market 
economy or the promotion of sustainable development and effective multilateralism 
(Van der Loo, Van Elsuwege and Petrov 2014: 12). However, the latter economic 
norms are not part of the ‘essential elements clause’ and cannot trigger a 
suspension of the agreement in case of a breach.  
 
Nevertheless, economic and political values can be at odds – and the economic 
concerns often prevail. For example, the pursuit of economic interests and of 
democratization or political stability may enter into conflict. As pointed out by 
Panebianco (2006: 141), “economic liberalization and the establishment of free 
markets – which are also crucial EU values – seem to come before human rights and 
democratic principles”. The Union faces the general problem of how to prioritize 
among competing ENP goals such as security, good governance and economic 
aspirations. Art. 21 TEU does not provide a ranking of objectives but simply calls for 
consistency between the different areas of EU external action and between these 
and its other policies. Consistency implies, for example, that the EU treats countries 
in comparable human rights situation in a similar way in terms of sanctions. 
Consistency is crucial for the EU’s credibility, as is the own example set by Europe. 
Taking a principled stance on human rights and democracy, but then backtracking 
on it in function of the economic or political importance of the third country 
concerned, risks damaging the EU’s credibility. Overall, the EU has tended to 
prioritize the first generation of human rights, civil and political rights, over the 
second generation of economic, social and cultural rights in its external relations 
(e.g. Kerremans and Orbie 2009: 638; Orbie and Babarinde 467; Bartels 2004: 386; 
Byrne 2004). Moreover, the EU is said to have a longstanding, marked preference 
for positive over negative measures in its external relations, with suspension being 
only a measure of last resort.  
 
Conflicts may also arise within the same group of values, for instance between 
sustainable development and poverty reduction on the one hand and trade 
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liberalization on the other, or between political stability and democratization (Börzel 
and van Hüllen 2014). EU-sceptical Islamist parties winning free elections in 
southern ENP countries are a case in point. Although the EU viewed the Arab Spring 
as a window of opportunity for democracy, as events unfolded, it still prioritized 
security concerns as a response to the threat of instability in North Africa (Dandashly 
2015). 
 
Promoting regional economic integration in the neighbourhood could also be seen as 
a value, as stated by the European Commission (2004: 4): “The European 
Neighbourhood Policy will reinforce existing forms of regional and subregional 
cooperation and provide a framework for their further development.” However, so far, 
the economic relations between the EU and its partners, reinforced by the principles 
of differentiation and conditionality, resulted rather in a bilateral ‘hub-and-spoke’ 
pattern which militates against regional cooperation (Gstöhl 2012: 100). This is also 
pointed out by Pace (2007: 662):  
“The ideal of ‘shared’ and ‘common’ values is […] reflected in the kind of Europe 
that is projected to the south: a model of cooperation and peace that should be 
emulated in the Mediterranean. Yet, the ENP is highly focused on bilateral 
(rather than multilateral, cooperative and intra-regional) relations.” 
 
Finally, although the EU likes to refer to universal values, its policy has been 
criticized as being Eurocentric or confined to ‘Western values’. 
 
The (re-)emergence of competing values  
 
In order to be a normative power, the outside world has to attribute such a distinct 
role to an actor. In the post-Western world the EU is but one among several regional 
actors promoting its norms. The outside perception of the EU as an international 
economic power is predominant, while it is seen as a weaker political and diplomatic 
actor (Larsen 2014: 902). More specifically, studies found that “the EU is not viewed 
as a normative power in Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa”, nor in the 
United States, but in its eastern and southern neighbourhood the EU is to some 
extent perceived as a normative power and values such as human rights and 
democracy are associated with Brussels (ibid.: 903-904). Nevertheless, the rise of 
the BRICs and other emerging economies has turned the international system into a 
multipolar order in which the EU is but one major actor among others. Instead of the 
‘end of history’ – a universalization of Western liberal democracy – alternative 
models and values have persisted or (re-)surfaced. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War that triggered a wave of democratization and the 
triumph of the market economy, the European Union has worked on the assumption 
that its neighbourhood is likely to subscribe to common values. However, while the 
post-modern European states have been further pooling their sovereignty, many of 
the 16 ENP partners have been struggling with authoritarian regimes or ‘managed 
democracies’. Whereas Europe has become more secular, political Islam has been 
on the rise in Turkey and the Arab world. To varying degrees, and with the exception 
of Azerbaijan and Lebanon, predominantly Muslim societies in ENP countries appear 
to favour the application of Islamic law (sharia) or at least parts thereof, and a role for 
religious leaders in politics (Pew Research Center 2013).  
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In the post-Soviet space, many policymakers have remained attached to traditional 
concepts such as national sovereignty and non-interference or zero-sum game 
spheres of influence. As argued by Korosteleva (2012: 49), the normative disjunction 
between the West and the former Soviet Union is “deeply rooted in public 
perceptions whereby people clearly and uncompromisingly differentiate between 
Western values – of market economy, human rights, democracy and lawfulness – 
and their own values – of peace, tolerance, respect for cultural heritage and religion”. 
Many post-Soviet countries also demonstrate an enduring proclivity for strong 
leadership and a strong corporate state. In particular the Russian elite considered 
the Western understanding of human rights “as a dubious concept, insofar as it 
extends beyond the protection of personal freedom to impose and promote other 
values that contradict the traditional Russian religious and national values” (Leino 
and Petrov 2009: 668). Orthodoxy and Russian culture and language are 
emphasized as key elements of a Russian civilization (Shlapentokh 2013). Kratochvíl 
(2008: 417) finds that the Russian foreign policy elite believes in state-centrism, in 
Russia’s great power status and that Russia has frequently been treated unfairly. 
“The deeply ingrained normative underpinnings of Russian foreign policy remain 
largely incompatible with those of the EU” (ibid.: 398). 
 
Contestation of the promotion of values  
 
For Manners (2002: 244-245), EU norm diffusion takes place through unintentional 
diffusion (contagion), informational diffusion (strategic and declaratory 
communications), procedural diffusion (in an institutionalized relationship), 
transference (for instance through trade and aid) or overt diffusion (through physical 
EU presence). If the export of values is understood – as is the case in the ENP – as 
a deliberate and active attempt of the Union to externalize norms rather than just an 
essentially passive influence, the main mechanisms are linked to procedural and 
transference diffusion. In a similar vein, Damro (2012: 692) argues that the EU 
exercises its market power through tools “such as the use of positive and negative 
conditionality, international legal instruments and internal regulatory measures” in its 
relations to both states and non-state actors. The ‘market access conditionality’ in 
the DCFTAs, for instance, is based on a strict monitoring process, inspired by the 
pre-accession methodology, and the process of legislative approximation and the 
effective enforcement and implementation of the agreement are subject to 
permanent scrutiny (Van der Loo, Van Elsuwege and Petrov 2014: 28).  
 
The EU engages in promoting its values and norms through unilateral instruments, 
bilateral agreements or non-binding instruments such as human rights or policy 
dialogues, Council conclusions, people-to-people exchanges, Action Plans and 
Progress Reports (Cremona 2011: 292-307). Ex ante conditionality may require that 
certain conditions be fulfilled before entering or upgrading a relationship or lifting 
sanctions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Ex post conditionality is 
present in various EU instruments: the most common are human rights and 
democracy clauses in bi- or multilateral agreements and in regulations of financial 
aid (except for humanitarian assistance) or in autonomous trade preferences. 
Positive conditionality promises benefits to a country for desired action, while 
negative conditionality threatens punitive sanctions for not respecting crucial norms 
and values. These incentives and disincentives may also be combined in a ‘carrot 
and stick’ policy as in the ENP.  
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These mechanisms of value export have been challenged. Some neighbours at the 
receiving end have been unable and/or unwilling to accept and absorb the values, or 
the EU and its member states have failed to conduct a consistent and credible 
policy, especially with regard to conditionality, and they had to face the normative 
rivalry of other external actors. 
 
Lack of capacity and/or willingness in ENP countries 
 
The European Union enjoys weaker political leverage, the lower the willingness and 
the capacity of governments and other domestic actors in the ENP countries to deal 
with reforms (Börzel 2011: 400; Gstöhl 2008: 285-288). 
 
First, a crucial precondition for a successful norm export is the political will in the 
ENP countries to tackle the domestic reforms required. In authoritarian regimes veto 
players are most likely placed at the governmental level and an EU norm export will 
in particular depend on its anticipated effects on the executive’s power, that is the 
political costs of adopting reforms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 670). In 
other words, the EU’s challenge “remains how to put pressure on […] governments 
to aim for ‘common values’ (in particular democratic reforms) when these 
governments view such norms as threatening their own hold on power” (Pace 2007: 
663). Moreover, the resonance of EU values is not the same in all societies. 
Socialization research suggests that persuasion is more likely if the target is in a 
novel and uncertain environment, has few ingrained beliefs inconsistent with the 
socializing institution and wants to belong to the latter (Checkel 2005: 813). 
Transition countries tend to be more receptive to EU norms than authoritarian 
regimes because they are likely to be more open to new ideas after their old 
governance systems were discredited.  
 
Second, a lack of absorption capacity may hamper political and economic reforms. 
For economies lacking strong institutions and administrative capacities, regulatory 
approximation to EU standards can involve onerous costs, possibly resulting in 
higher domestic prices and trade diversion (Messerlin et al. 2011: i-ii). It can, for 
instance, be questioned whether the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas 
requiring alignment to and selective adoption of EU acquis are the most suitable 
instruments for countries facing serious development challenges. The DCFTAs cover 
substantially all trade in goods and services as well as ‘behind-the-border’ issues, 
such as technical and other standards, competition policy, industrial policy, 
intellectual property rights, company law, public procurement and financial services. 
By replicating the enlargement process, the ENP causes the EU’s neighbours “to 
lose a level of independence at a crucial time in their democratic reform and 
economic restructuring programmes” while receiving fewer benefits in return than the 
applicant countries did (Leino and Petrov 2009: 665).  
 
The Association Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, signed in June 
2014, contain several legislative approximation mechanisms with varying degrees of 
obligation and various procedures to amend the incorporated rules. Also the dispute 
settlement varies across sectors from consultation, arbitration or mediation to rulings 
by the Court of Justice of the EU (Van der Loo, Van Elsuwege and Petrov 2014: 14-
22). In particular, the countries commit to incorporate the relevant acquis regarding 
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technical barriers to trade and certain services. The Association Council monitors the 
application of the agreement and serves as forum to discuss new relevant 
legislation. As already mentioned, the DCFTAs are based on far-reaching ‘market 
access conditionality’ which links additional access to the internal market to the 
country’s progress in implementation. They entail “a move from the soft law 
approach based on persuasion and assistance to a comprehensive, binding and 
detailed legal framework structuring relations between the EU and its Eastern 
neighbours” (Delcour and Wolczuk 2013: 190). Nevertheless, a country’s 
commitment to adopt and implement EU norms does not necessarily mean that this 
is actually followed up by their transposition into domestic law, nor by their 
application (Langbein and Wolczuk 2012). The will and the capacity to adapt, as 
necessary, the political systems, economies and societies to the imported norms 
remain crucial.  
 
Lack of capacity and/or willingness in the EU 
 
The value export may be hampered not only by shortcomings in the ENP countries 
but also by inadequacies on the side of the European Union: the lack of political will, 
capacity or, as a result, inconsistency. 
 
First, the (un)willingness of the EU actors or the member states to deliver certain 
incentives can be seen in light of the transposition of the enlargement methodology 
to the ENP despite the lack of an EU membership perspective. The European Union 
was not ready to make any accession promises to the Eastern partners and left the 
ENP’s ultimate objective open. In 2006 the European Commission (2006: 5) 
introduced the concept of “a longer-term vision of an economic community emerging 
between the EU and its ENP partners”, which “would include such points as the 
application of shared regulatory frameworks and improved market access for goods 
and services among ENP partners, and some appropriate institutional arrangement 
such as dispute settlement mechanisms”. Such a Neighbourhood Economic 
Community would offer the neighbours ‘a stake’ in the internal market (see Gstöhl 
2012). This future perspective may not be sufficiently attractive and concrete for 
some neighbours. The existence of a membership option may not only encourage 
the partner countries to make a bigger effort but also the EU. Without such a 
perspective, the EU’s ability to deliver real incentives, such as the liberalization of 
agricultural exports, labour migration or EU involvement in the resolution of regional 
conflicts, remains constrained since it includes areas in which the Union faces strong 
vested interests in some EU member states. Some progress has been made over 
time with regard to trade in agricultural products and visa liberalization. Although the 
ENP was to “reinforce stability and security and contribute to efforts at conflict 
resolution” and to promote good neighbourliness (European Commission 2004: 4), in 
practice the EU has been rather reluctant to get involved in the conflicts in Moldova 
(Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Azerbaijan-Armenia 
(Nagorno-Karabakh) or the Western Sahara and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not 
to mention the wars in Libya and Syria.  
 
Second, the EU may not only lack the necessary member state support but also the 
legal competences or face other constraints to act on certain issues. A case in point 
is the non-participation of the neighbours in the decision-making process about the 
actual meaning of common values and their further development (Leino and Petrov 
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2009: 666-667). This lack of ‘input legitimacy’ – or real joint ownership – hampers the 
internalization of norms in ENP countries. As non-EU members, the neighbours risk 
facing a fundamental dilemma the more closely they become involved with the EU. 
Other neighbourhood models of deep economic integration, such as the EU-Turkey 
customs union, the EU-Swiss bilateralism or the European Economic Area, have in 
recent years reached their limits since they cover more and more sectors but lack 
efficient institutional arrangements for ensuring the necessary market homogeneity 
(Gstöhl 2015). The Council of the EU (2012: 5-6) underlined that any close 
relationships with neighbouring countries must be guided by the principles of 
homogeneity and legal certainty because they “guarantee the efficiency, 
sustainability and ultimately the credibility of the single market”. This increasingly 
implies the conclusion of agreements which foresee a dynamic adaptation to the 
acquis, its uniform interpretation as well as an independent surveillance and judicial 
enforcement. Such a measure of supranationality without full participation in the 
relevant EU decision-making processes encroaches upon national autonomy. The 
DCFTAs provide only for a limited form of ‘decision-shaping’ in specific areas where 
full internal market treatment is foreseen (Van der Loo, Van Elsuwege and Petrov 
2014: 19). 
 
Third, the lack of capacity and/or willingness to offer the ENP countries certain 
benefits or to endorse the values by reacting to non-compliance may generate 
inconsistent EU policies. This may concern either vertical consistency between EU 
policies and national policies of the member states or horizontal consistency 
between different EU policies. For example, the EU’s promotion of human rights and 
democracy in the ENP has frequently been trumped by economic or security 
interests (see Balfour 2006; Ghazaryan 2014: 172-176). The Arab Spring caught 
Europe off guard and revealed how the EU and its member states had for the sake 
of political stability (including containing the flows of migration, terrorism and 
organized crime) connived with authoritarian regimes. The EU’s engagement with 
autocratic regimes in ENP countries has over time become more pragmatic, shifting 
towards functional cooperation. For Bosse (2012: 367) “[t]his development is 
potentially serious, as it appears to mark the beginning of the end of the EU’s 
ambition to act as a successful democratizer in its immediate neighbourhood”. Kurki 
(2011: 230-231) argues that the technocratic approach glosses over the unclear 
normative meaning of democracy in EU discourse and that it pulls EU democracy 
promotion “towards depoliticisation, assumptions of harmony, rationalistic and 
economistic methods, objectivist measurements and management, and technocratic 
rather than democratic ways of legitimising policies”. On the other hand, a low-profile 
approach to democracy promotion may help promote the socialization and 
internalization of norms in societies and officials. While the EU institutions are 
entangled in bureaucratic technicalities, the EU member states often ignore 
conditionality in their bilateral dealings with ENP countries. In order to be effective, 
however, the member states must be willing to support EU conditionality policy 
instead of disengaging or even pursuing detrimental policies.  
 
Finally, in addition to domestic factors in either the ENP countries or the EU, the role 
of external competitors may play a role because of competing mechanisms of value 
export. The Russia-Georgian war in 2008, the consequences of the Arab Spring 
since 2010, and in particular the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in 
eastern Ukraine have served as wake-up calls for the EU to think more geopolitically.  
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Normative (market) power rivalry 
 
The EU’s efforts of value promotion are based on the assumption that the 
(European) model of democracy and market economy can and should be exported. 
However, this assumption may be questioned not only by the ENP countries 
themselves but also by external actors. While the east struggles with the ‘Russia 
factor’, in the south a number of players ranging from the US to Turkey, Russia, 
China, Saudi Arabia and Qatar pursue their own agenda (Lehne 2014: 9). 
 
In the Southern Mediterranean several countries, especially Tunisia, Egypt, Libya 
and Syria, rebelled against Western-backed authoritarian rulers. In some countries 
powerful counter-revolutions have taken place afterwards. The rich Gulf monarchies 
have tried to ‘buy off’ their citizens and supported regressive forces in the region, 
including in the Maghreb, while the poorer monarchies Morocco and Jordan 
implemented rather cosmetic domestic reforms (Leonard 2014). Democracy 
promotion implies that the EU must engage in dialogue with all political groups and 
not just those that mirror Western values. Political Islam is not a unitary force but 
characterized by important splits between different interpretations of Islam such as 
between the Shi’ite and Sunni and between the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Salafists. As argued by Leonard (2014), the political awakening in the Arab Spring “is 
about people claiming democratic rights to emancipate themselves from the 
traditional influence of the West, rather than trying to join it”.  
 
In the East, the European Union shares an overlapping neighbourhood with an 
increasingly assertive Russia that has reverted to great power aspirations. Russia 
had from the very beginning opted out of the ENP and insisted on a strategic 
partnership ‘between equals’. In addition, the Russian government began to 
increasingly put forward its own normative agenda in the region. As argued by 
Haukkala (2008: 41), energy-rich Russia can use mechanisms that are not at the 
EU’s disposal to foster bilateral relations, it plays a role in many ‘frozen conflicts’ in 
the region, and it has sought to develop “an alternative model of economic 
modernisation and societal development to that promoted by the EU”. By offering a 
different set of national, cultural and religious values for the post-Soviet space, “the 
language of values also provides Russia with a possibility to challenge the 
conditionality policy attached to the EU’s reading of the values it declares” (Leino 
and Petrov 2009: 669).  
 
Moreover, the Russian market is broadly accessible to countries that share the 
legacy of Soviet standards. The GOST technical standards are less competitive than 
the EU standards, and the implementation of the DCFTAs would imply a gradual 
phasing out of GOST standards (Dreyer and Popescu 2014: 2). When Russia in 
2011 proposed to develop its customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan into a 
Eurasian Economic Union that could extend to the post-Soviet space, it de facto 
compelled countries in the common neighbourhood to choose between this project 
and a DCFTA with the EU, unless the EU would instead conclude an FTA with the 
entire Eurasian customs union (Delcour and Kostanyan 2014: 5). Russia presented 
the Eurasian integration as a project of economic modernization based on 
international law but did not shy away from threatening sanctions vis-à-vis its 
neighbours (Delcour and Wolczuk 2013: 192-197). The announcement of the 
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Armenian government in the run-up to the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in 
November 2013 that it intended to join the Eurasian customs union and the decision 
of the Ukrainian government to suspend the signature of its Association Agreement 
and DCFTA with the EU clearly demonstrated that these countries are facing two 
‘centres of gravity’. The Eurasian integration project “means that the EU is no longer 
the only actor promoting deep economic integration premised on regulatory 
convergence in the post-Soviet space” (ibid.: 180). However, the economic benefits 
of the Eurasian Economic Union launched in 2015 are questionable given the high 
tariff levels that make imports from the EU and China more expensive and question 
the commitments of WTO members Armenia and Kyrgyzstan while complicating 
Kazakhstan’s negotiations on WTO accession. Russia therefore offers a range of 
subsidies to its (potential) partners in the form of cheaper gas or loans and access to 
its labour market (Popescu 2014: 11-14).  
 
In the end, the ENP’s value export proved more attractive for Moldova, Georgia and 
finally – after the ‘EuroMaidan revolution’ – to Ukraine than to Armenia, Azerbaijan or 
Belarus, although the latter share some concerns about Russia’s dominance in the 
Eurasian Economic Union. 
 
Conclusions: conceptual flaws beyond implementation problems  
 
In the post-Cold War era the EU has increasingly emphasized the role of values in its 
external action and in particular in its neighbourhood. The Lisbon Treaty made it 
even clearer that any EU foreign policy strategy should be based upon both values 
and interests. As the European Neighbourhood Policy unfolded over time, the 
resistance that the promotion of values encountered in some countries has been 
growing instead of fading away. This paper examined the role of values in the ENP 
and the reasons for their unexpected contestation in recent years. It has been 
argued that the values themselves have been challenged because of their ambiguity, 
potential conflicts between them and the (re-)emergence of competing values 
abroad. In addition, the promotion of values has been questioned due to factors 
linked to the incapacity and/or unwillingness of either the neighbours or of the EU 
and its member states, and because of the normative rivalry of other external actors. 
More precisely, the ENP has been plagued by implementation problems such as an 
inconsistent and selective application of political conditionality, often disengaged EU 
member states, a techno-bureaucratic approach that turned out to be too demanding 
for many countries.  
 
In a nutshell, the role of values in the ENP has been facing challenges of capacity, 
consistency and competition. In addition to such implementation problems, the ENP 
has suffered from certain conceptual flaws (see also Lehne 2014): first of all, the 
policy embraces sixteen countries that have little in common except for their 
geographical proximity to the EU. Originally designed for ‘Wider Europe’ in the 
immediate east to the EU, the ENP was quickly extended to the Southern 
Mediterranean and the Southern Caucasus. The heterogeneity of the countries in 
these two geographical dimensions led a few years later to the creation of the Union 
for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership.  
 
Second, the ENP has produced a ‘hub-and-spoke’ system of bilateral relationships at 
the expense of a regional approach, as illustrated by the patterns of trade and 
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investment flows (Kallioras 2013). The EU’s initiatives to promote regional 
cooperation in its neighbourhood have also been hampered by the contested nature 
of the regions and confusion over the goals of regional cooperation, the gap between 
the ends sought by the EU and the means available to it, and the existence of 
enduring conflicts in these regions (Cottey 2012). 
 
Third, the ENP applies a methodology that has largely been derived from the 
enlargement process, such as targeted expert assistance, twinning arrangements 
with member state administrations, participation in EU programmes and agencies, 
conditionality policy, monitoring and progress reports, as well as the bilateral rather 
than multilateral focus. Moreover, the EU’s assumption that all partner countries 
were trying to emulate the European model was mistaken. The long-term 
perspective of a Neighbourhood Economic Community may, however, not make up 
for the lack of an accession perspective as a motivation for reforms and 
approximation. The ENP has largely been driven by the European Commission, later 
joined by the newly created European External Action Service, but the member 
states have often remained disengaged or pursued their own bilateral foreign policy 
vis-à-vis the ENP countries. In this context, the lack of participation of the ENP 
countries in the decision-making – or at least decision-shaping – process sits in the 
long run squarely with the principle of joint ownership and an expanding ‘stake’ in the 
internal market.  
 
Fourth, the ENP’s principle of joint ownership appears somewhat at odds with the 
principle of political conditionality which states that “the level of ambition of the EU’s 
relationships with its neighbours will take into account the extent to which these 
values are effectively shared” (European Commission 2004: 3), resulting in a policy 
of differentiation among the ENP partners. The 2011 review of the ENP introduced 
an even more explicit ‘more for more’ approach: “only those partners willing to 
embark on political reforms and to respect the shared universal values of human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law have been offered the most rewarding aspects 
of the EU policy, notably economic integration […], mobility of people […], as well as 
greater EU financial assistance” (European Commission and High Representative 
2012: 3-4). Moreover, joint ownership allows ENP countries to downgrade the role of 
values in Action Plans to which they are opposed.  
 
Fifth, a Eurocentric approach to the ENP tends to ignore the role of other influential 
actors in the neighbourhood. These other actors may pursue different and competing 
objectives. The EU was not prepared for the challenges that its – supposedly 
universal – values and their promotion have met. It did not sufficiently think 
strategically ahead. Adding a more geopolitical approach may help sharpen the EU’s 
strategic focus and make it a more influential international partner. The Union and its 
member states need to rely on clear values, interests and matching capabilities and 
avoid incoherent policies in order to credibly address the growing expectations 
regarding the export of stability, peace and prosperity. The EU needs to strike a 
better balance between the promotion of values and geostrategic thinking – which 
does not imply a zero-sum game vision. The ENP review that European Commission 
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